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Abstract 
The transition to a low-carbon economy will entail a large-scale structural change. Some 
industries will have to expand their relative economic weight, while other industries, 
especially those directly linked to fossil fuel production and consumption, will have to 
decline. Such a systemic shift may have major repercussions on the stability of financial 
systems, via abrupt asset revaluations, defaults on debt and the creation of bubbles. Studies 
on previous industrial transitions have shed light on the financial transition risks originating 
from rapidly rising ‘sunrise’ industries. In contrast, we argue here, based on a critical review 
of the literature, that a comprehensive theoretical framework to analyse how declining 
‘sunset’ industries might affect financial stability in the current low-carbon transition, via 
stranded assets or otherwise, is still lacking. We contribute to filling this research gap by 
developing a consistent theoretical framework of the drivers, transmission channels and 
impacts of the phase-out of carbon-intensive industries on the financial system as well as its 
feedback into the rest of the economy.  
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Introduction 
Climate-change mitigation requires the rapid decarbonisation of the economy. Climate 
change is already threatening society through altered patterns of extreme weather events 
and impacts on critical ecosystems, and the best climate projections to date indicate that 
catastrophic impacts could arise in the near future from nonlinear effects leading to ‘tipping-
points’ in the Earth system, such as the collapse of ice sheets or tropical rainforests (Lenton 
et al., 2008). The 2015 Paris agreement enshrines the need to avoid such consequences 
with a goal of stabilizing temperature increases well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels, 
with the aim of limiting negative climate change impacts at manageable levels, although 
substantial climate variability would still remain (Holden et al., 2018). To avoid warming of 
the global average temperature exceeding 1.5°C, evidence gathered by the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change suggests that decreasing net carbon emissions 
to zero by mid-century is likely to be necessary (IPCC, 2018). Consequently, governments 
and sub-national entities have started adopting laws requiring carbon neutrality by or before 
mid-century. 
Decarbonising the economy quickly is not trivial. It will involve large-scale structural change, 
with some sectors having to rapidly expand their relative production/market shares, and 
others having to entirely transform their technological basis or, alternatively, shrink and 
potentially disappear. This last category of sectors comprises activities directly related to the 
extraction and distribution of fossil fuels, but also, and perhaps most importantly because it 
implicates a far larger proportion of the economy, sectors producing goods and services 
using fossil fuels as a crucial input in their production process. In some cases, such as 
power production, a low-carbon alternative is available that is increasingly competitive with 
the incumbent (Lazard, 2019). Increasing electrification of end-use technologies, such as 
passenger transport, also points towards promising paths for decarbonisation (IEA, 2019). 
But in other industries, such as steel or air travel, development is only at an early stage, and 
a significant proportion of firms still lack a strategic plan to face the low-carbon transition 
(Dietz et al., 2020). 
A fast transformation of economic structure is likely to have significant financial impacts. A 
lively debate has been developing around the threats of a low-carbon transition for the 
stability of financial institutions, and for the financial system as a whole, with central banks 
occupying a prominent position. While there has been a rapid expansion of concepts and 
evidence concerning transition risks from academia, private industry and regulators (Bolton, 
Despres, Pereira Da Silva, Samama, & Svartzman, 2020; NGFS, 2019), a comprehensive 
theoretical framework linking the low-carbon structural change to financial dynamics is still 
missing. It is not yet clear what the risk drivers, sectoral origins and transmission channels 
will be, or how their effects will propagate to the wider macroeconomy. 
The aim of this paper is to shed some light on how risks for financial stability relate to the 
transition’s underlying structural change. First, we survey the literature for insights on the 
general links between structural change and finance. The low-carbon transition is certainly 
not the first systemic technological shift in recent history, and several authors have 
discussed the issue of how these paradigm shifts are linked to finance (Freeman & Louca, 
2001; Perez, 1983; Schumpeter, 1939). We find that the overwhelming majority of this 
literature has focused on the financial risks stemming from the sunrise industries, i.e. the 
rising sectors, where bubbles could develop and then burst, with detrimental impacts on the 
rest of society. 
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Turning to the low-carbon transition, we notice how, contrary to this historical perspective, 
most of the current debate on transition-related financial risks focuses on the risks raised by 
sunset industries (carbon-intensive ones, in this case). For instance, a widespread 
preoccupation concerns the financial repercussions of asset stranding, i.e. the devaluation or 
write-off of assets from the balance sheets of economic agents (Caldecott, 2018; van der 
Ploeg & Rezai, 2019). We argue that this difference is likely because the transition has not 
yet advanced far enough for low-carbon investment opportunities to be able to stabilize the 
financial system, while climate-change mitigation policy remains focused on attempts to 
accelerate the phase-out of high carbon sectors. Be that as it may, the ‘focus shift’ between 
past literature on transitions and the current debate leaves us without a well-defined 
comprehensive framework to understand and address low-carbon transition financial risks. 
To advance the debate and contribute to filling this conceptual gap, we develop a minimal 
but consistent framework of low-carbon risks for finance originating in sunset industries. We 
distinguish: i) drivers of transition risks; ii) the economic costs that the transition could 
impose on non-financial agents in terms of loss of income and asset stranding; iii) the 
impacts that these costs would create on financial institutions and financial stability, in terms 
of non-performing loans, loss in portfolio values and higher expenditures; and iv) the wider 
macroeconomic effects leading to a loss of aggregate demand and recession. Finally, we 
outline and comment on the current state of policies seeking to stabilize the financial system 
without interfering with the transition itself pursed by central banks and other actors in the 
fast-evolving policy community on climate-related financial risks. 
The remainder of the article is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the economic 
literature linking structural change, innovation and finance. Section 3 focuses on the ongoing 
debate around the risks of a low-carbon transition. Section 4 presents our conceptual 
framework on transition risks for finance originating in sunset industries. Section 5 discusses 
actual and possible policies aimed at mitigating transition risks. Section 6 concludes.  
 
Threats to financial stability from the rise and fall of industries 
For the purposes of analysing transition risks to finance, we define the low-carbon transition 
as structural economic change: some parts of the economy grow and others decline in 
relative importance, as a result of deliberate policy, changing preferences and ongoing 
technological change.1 To meet emissions-reduction targets, low-carbon sunrise industries 
must grow rapidly, while high-carbon sunset industries must decline rapidly. This process 
can precipitate and interact with other structural changes in the economy (Ciarli & Savona, 
2019). Low-carbon transition risks for finance can then be defined as the threat to financial 
stability from this specific type of (rapid) structural change. For a conceptual understanding 
of this process, we turn to the literatures on financial crises and on innovation as the process 
underlying structural change. 
Finance and innovation: A neglected subfield 
At the outset, it is important to note the relative conceptual neglect of the problem. Scholars 
studying financial crises rarely venture into the details of technological change, but focus on 
aggregate fluctuations. Kindleberger (1978), the classic reference on historical financial 
crises, eschews the details of the technical change that underlies several of his documented 
 
1 Cherp et al. (2018) show that for other purposes adopting a more multi-disciplinary definition can be 
productive. 
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financial manias. The only technological change Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) refer to is the 
financial innovation of changing from coin to paper money. Similarly, innovation scholarship, 
which studies structural change due to technological and behavioural change, tends to omit 
systemic financial aspects; recent exceptions are Callegari (2018) and Geddes and Schmidt 
(2018). Even students of ‘financing innovation’ tend to adopt a microeconomic perspective 
on how market failures prevent a small set of innovative firms from getting enough funding 
(Hall & Lerner, 2010), but neglect innovation’s interaction with financial stability. If anything, 
research in this area considers the opposite direction of causation, i.e. how the 2007-08 
financial crisis and subsequent stimuli have affected innovation (Giebel & Kraft, 2019; 
Mundaca & Richter, 2015). 
Multisectoral theories of technological change lie in the small intersection of both fields. 
Perhaps the oldest such programme of continued relevance is to be found in Marxist crisis 
theories (Basu, 2018), building on Karl Marx’s unique attention to technology as explaining 
social change (Rosenberg, 1982). Marx’s differentiation of the economy into sectors 
producing capital and consumption goods (departments 1 and 2) allows for both 
underconsumption (Sweezy, 1970) or over-investment (Brenner, 2006) to generate a crisis. 
But existing Marxist literature tends to disregard industries within departments: both low-
carbon and high-carbon industries are subsumed in each department.  
More recent real business cycle theory explains (negative) shocks through technological 
change also in multi-sectoral settings (Davis, 1987). But technology shocks are typically 
random, not linked to secularly declining or rising industries (Azariadis & Kaas, 2016). 
Moreover, integrating a meaningful financial sector into these models would require major 
changes to the theoretical framework (Stiglitz, 2014). The only theoretical framework placing 
the interaction of finance and structural change front and centre appears to be the 
Schumpeterian one.2 
The Schumpeterian perspective 
In the Schumpeterian theory of the business cycle, innovative agents (entrepreneurs) create 
new clusters of vastly more productive technologies, collectively cause socio-technical 
transitions, and generate structural change through ‘creative destruction’ of less competitive 
products and industries.3 Examples where this theory applies include railway transport and 
steam shipping, based on steam engine diffusion, replacing canal and sailing ship transport 
in the second half of the 19th century; the internal combustion engine based on oil displacing 
steam-powered transport in the early 20th century (Freeman & Perez, 1988); or more 
recently electronics revolutionizing data processing (Mowery & Rosenberg, 1998). 
The financial sector and specifically banks play a crucial role in enabling entrepreneurs to 
finance their new enterprises by creating credit (Schumpeter, 1939). Only with the support of 
financial institutions can entrepreneurs acquire the resources for executing their innovative 
plans and creating sunrise industries. While the credit creation function of banks is key to 
innovation and leads to output expansion in a ‘primary wave’, the increasingly profitable 
sunrise industries become objects of financial speculation. This ‘secondary wave’ of the 
business cycle carries the risk of overestimating sunrise industries’ growth potential 
(Schumpeter 1939, p. 147). Over-indebtedness and defaults can result from the exhaustion 
of an innovation cluster, and generate a financial crisis. One instance that this theory can 
 
2 Hayek (1931), like Marxist authors, only distinguishes consumption and capital goods sectors. 
3 Reinert (2002) and Hagemann (2003) discuss important theoretical influences on Schumpeter’s 
thinking. 
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explain is the 1929 financial crisis, which involved a bubble in radio, electricity, airplanes, 
automobile and petrochemical industries (Freeman & Louca, 2001). Similarly, the investment 
booms for the expansion of railways in the 19th century were at the root of financial crises in 
several countries in the mid-1800s (Vague, 2019), and the 2001 ‘dotcom’ bubble burst even 
carries a sunrise industry’s name. In practice, the distinction between speculative and 
conventional investment may be partly artificial, the key being a miscalculation of risk that is 
only revealed retrospectively. Nevertheless, these examples illustrate the link between 
structural change and transition risks for the financial sector. 
In Schumpeter’s theory the origin of these risks lies in sunrise industries. Uncertainty about 
what technological design will ultimately prevail and about the scale at which the growing 
industry saturates, creates the potential for speculation and over-investment that have been 
characterized as ‘manias’ (Kindleberger, 1978) and ‘irrational exuberance’ (Shiller, 2001). 
Once the bubble bursts, and the financial crisis starts, it can be exacerbated by the failure of 
financially unstable sunset firms. However, the theory largely ignores the contribution of 
sunset industries to the onset of financial instability, and Schumpeter explicitly states that the 
negative effects of bankruptcy and decline in the sunset industries is overcompensated by 
the growth in the new industries (Schumpeter 1939, p. 134-5). In other words, as long as a 
strong sunrise sector exists, systemic economic and financial stability are not compromised 
by a failing sunset sector, even though sunset capital owners lose out and periods of 
‘structural crises of adjustment’ spell unemployment and decline in living standards for a 
significant share of the population (Freeman & Louca, 2001). A recent example that is also 
relevant to the low-carbon transition is the layoffs and declines in living-standards in coal-
mining communities catalysing demands for a ‘just transition’ (Rosemberg, 2010). 
Subsequent work by Schumpeterian scholars emphasises the important role of government 
policy and social change in the assimilation of new technologies, which was assumed to 
happen automatically by Schumpeter (Freeman & Louca, 2001; Perez, 1983). The role of 
finance in these technological revolutions that change the ‘techno-economic paradigm’ is 
developed by Carlota Perez (2002). Her work highlights how the aftermath of the financial 
collapse that marks the end of the initial speculation with sunrise industry reveals the social 
problems resulting from the changes and generates anger, revolt and populism. A new set of 
regulations and institutions are needed at this turning point to establish a direction for 
innovation and investment, spreading the new technologies in socially beneficial ways.4 An 
important take-home message from this literature is the role of government in regulating and 
managing economic instability arising from structural change. 
Technology-based financial instability can also be seen as a case of Hyman Minsky’s (1975, 
1986) financial instability hypothesis, which describes how the financial sector continuously 
drives itself towards financial crises through the creation of increasingly complex financial 
structures, the accumulation of debt and financial innovation (recent discussions include 
Nikolaidi & Stockhammer, 2017; Taylor, 2012). Although innovation and technological 
change are exogenous in Minsky, his understanding of the relation of profit opportunities and 
financial speculation adds important insights to transition risks stemming from the fast 
development of rising industries. 
Risks associated with sunset industries 
 
4 Note the parallels with the Marxist social structure of accumulation and regulation theories as a crisis 
being the turning point in the transition between two forms of capitalism (Kotz, 1990).  
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To the best of our knowledge, to date there is little theory that explains financial instability 
caused by sunset industries.5 The Schumpeterian literature locates the crisis mechanism in 
the sunrise industries, while the contribution to financial risks from declining industries is left 
largely unexplored. Caiani et al. (2014) show that systemic risk from sunset industries can 
be shown mathematically to cause economic distress, but more theoretical effort is needed 
to determine under what conditions asset scrapping can trigger a financial crisis.  
A theoretical literature from the 1930s and 1940s discusses the microeconomic problem of 
‘premature abandonment’, an earlier term for asset stranding (Caplan, 1940). This literature 
evolved into vintage capital goods models of growth and fluctuations and the modern 
measurement of capital stock, but remains somewhat disconnected from structural change 
and in particular from financial risks (see e.g. Benhabib & Hobijn, 2003; Eisner, 1972). A 
neo-Schumpeterian vintage capital model allows for costly reallocation of factors of 
production between industries, but has not analysed under what conditions such reallocation 
could destabilize the financial system (Caballero & Hammour, 1996). 
Institutional economic history of the secular decline of the British economy offers a different 
lens on the contribution of sunset industries to financial risks. It is well documented that 
individual industries, such as cotton or steel suffered from chronic overcapacity after 1920, 
and that government programmes were instituted to scrap uncompetitive machines in order 
to reduce capacity (Lazonick, 1984; Tolliday, 1987). Banks that had lent during the uptick of 
domestic demand in 1919-20 found themselves in a precarious position in the subsequently 
stagnating British economy. But the focus of this literature is again on the reverse causal 
direction, namely to investigate how the nature of the British financial system influenced 
British manufacturing industries’ decline, not how decline conditioned financial instability 
(Best & Humphries, 1984; Higgins & Toms, 2003). 
In summary, economic theorists and historians have identified sunrise industry speculation 
as the trigger of financial crises, but have not substantially investigated systemic risks 
originating in sunset industries, even though the latter may contribute to the severity of the 
crisis once it is unleashed. Our conceptual review offers an important insight for the current 
low-carbon transition. An industry with declining demand generates losses for its owners, 
unemployment for its employees, and quite possibly a default on its loans. However, theory 
suggests this is not enough to destabilise the economy and induce systemic financial 
instability. The underlying logic argues that while some companies and even financial 
institution go under, the financial system as a whole is diversified and profitable enough to 
weather this shock thanks to the dynamic sunrise industries. It is only when the sunrise 
industries mature, and a bubble in their financial assets pops, that theory predicts the onset 
of crisis.  
 
Low-carbon transition risks from sunset industries 
In contrast with what has just been reviewed, the current debate on the low-carbon transition 
has so far focused on financial risk from sunset industries. The simple reason is that in order 
to achieve the Paris agreement targets, lots of currently productive enterprises have to 
radically alter their production. In particular, a good share of the emissions from currently 
known fossil fuel reserves must be suppressed (Carbon Tracker, 2013; Meinshausen et al., 
 
5 Szostack’s (1995) analysis of the Great Depression goes into detail about sunset industries but does 
not link to financial stability. 
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2009). The cash flow of industries supplying or using fossil fuels would be impacted. If this 
impact is unanticipated by investors, their assets would prematurely depreciate or ‘strand’ 
(Caldecott, 2018) and if the stranding is widespread enough, it could lead to a financial 
instability and crisis (Monasterolo, 2020; van der Ploeg & Rezai, 2019). 
Consideration of sunrise industry risks, on the other hand, is absent from the debate. While 
observer bias and timing may help explain some of this neglect (for instance, before the 
2007-8 crash few commentators pointed to a looming housing crisis), there is also some 
hard evidence to cite: Investment in low-carbon technologies has been increasing in recent 
decades, but they are still far away from the scale necessary to compensate for the phase-
out of fossil-based technologies under a 1.5°C scenario (CPI, 2019; McCollum et al., 2018; 
Semieniuk & Mazzucato, 2019). Nor are the investments yet vastly more profitable – support 
policies have so far been required to attract private investors even in the advanced power 
supply sector (Mazzucato & Semieniuk, 2018; Polzin, Egli, Steffen, & Schmidt, 2019). Of 
course, the fast market capitalization growth in some low-carbon companies such as Ørsted, 
market leader in offshore wind projects, or Tesla, an electric car maker, are examples of (so-
far) successful sunrise companies to point to (Financial Times, 2020a, 2020b). And there 
have already been instances of initially hyped low-carbon companies collapsing just as if 
their potential had been overestimated by Schumpeterian ‘speculators’, including 
photovoltaic cell makers Solarworld in Germany and Solyndra in the US. However, these 
instances hardly triggered systemic financial instability, just as the burst of the YieldCo 
bubble in the US in 2015 (share prices dropped 60%) did not destabilize wider stock markets 
(CPI, 2016). In short, at this moment, there does not yet seem to be a general ‘mania’ in the 
low-carbon sunrise industries. 
The timeline and scale of structural change implied by proposed climate-change mitigation 
then appears to make this transition different. The aim is to correct an externality using 
deliberate policy intervention (Foley, 2009; Nordhaus, 2013), rather than to let a more or less 
evolutionary trajectory guide the transition. Past theory does caution that, if the transition is 
managed well and innovation in low-carbon technologies is fast, then the world might soon 
find itself in the ‘typical’ situation whereby there are fast-growing low-carbon sunrise 
industries, that pose the risk of a ‘green bubble’.6 However, the current debate suggests that 
such a sunrise industry-induced financial instability, if it materialises, may be preceded by 
systemic risks realised in sunset industries. 
 
A model and classification of low-carbon transition risks 
So far, we have established that mechanisms causing risks for finance from new industries 
are fairly well understood, but the contrary is true of declining industries. To improve an 
understanding of possible channels whereby declining industry risks may operate, we 
classify them to identify the drivers, costs and impacts and their logical connection via 
transmission channels (summarised in Figure 1). We review evidence for each category as 
we describe it. 
 
6 Discussions of green bubbles have to date taken place mainly outside academia, e.g. in central 
banking circles (DNB, 2017). If anything, academic research has considered the reverse direction of 
causation, how the recent financial crisis has slowed the progress of the green transition (Falcone, 
Morone, & Sica, 2018; Geels, 2013). 
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Figure 1: Schematic view of chain of causation from risk drivers to impacts (boxes) via 
transmission channels (arrows). 
 
Transition risk drivers 
Transition risk drivers (Figure 1, box 1) can be conceptualised as changing relative prices or 
market demand/supply in favour of low-carbon goods and services, either immediately or 
over time. In the latter case, expectations about future changes may still create risks in the 
present (van der Ploeg & Rezai, 2020). Hence, Figure 1 can be read both as the potential 
unfolding of actual transition impacts and as a mental map of expected future impacts of 
transition drivers. Key drivers are climate change mitigation policy, technological change and 
changes in consumer taste (PRA, 2015). These are reviewed in turn below. 
Climate change mitigation policies 
Policy seeking to internalise the carbon externality is a key driver of risks. The central plank 
of most climate change mitigation strategies consists of incentive-based regulation that 
generates a carbon price either via taxes or cap-and-trade schemes. The suite of scenarios 
limiting global warming to 1.5°C in the recent IPCC report reports a median global carbon 
price of $91/tCO2 (metric ton of CO2) in 2025 and $179/tCO2 in 2030, with the interquartile 
range reaching up to $175/tCO2 and $361/tCO2 respectively (calculations based on 
Huppmann et al., 2018). In April 2019, only 20% of global greenhouse gas emissions were 
priced at all, and less than 5% of these were in line with Paris Agreement compatible levels 
(World Bank, 2019). Effective mitigation policies could therefore drastically increase industry 
and consumer prices for high-carbon products in the near future. Regulation may also 
directly limit the sale of high-carbon products. Ten countries have recently set specific times 
for bans on new internal combustion engine cars, some as soon as 2030 (Meckling & Nahm, 
2019).  
In addition, public subsidies, regulations and investments help lower prices of low-carbon 
products. Comprehensive policy approaches for ‘green growth’ such as China’s 13th 5-year 
plan (National Development and Reform Commission, 2016) or Europe’s Green Deal 
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(European Commission, 2019), include mandating, subsidising or directly carrying out 
investments into low-carbon products and installing enabling infrastructure. This makes low-
carbon products more competitive by creating markets, financing and helping innovation 
proceed at pace or simply altering prices directly (Block & Keller, 2011; Mazzucato & 
Semieniuk, 2017). Some policies can also directly affect the financial system such as 
differentiated prudential requirements, lending quotas or targeted refinancing lines by the 
central bank, indicated by arrow A in Figure 1, or alter the financial sector’s expectations 
(Volz, 2017; Campiglio et al., 2018). It is important not to confuse the policy here seeking to 
accelerate the transition (mitigation policy) with policy aimed at stabilizing the financial 
system, which we review in the next section. 
Technological change 
Cost-saving technological innovations, possibly incentivised by earlier climate policies, 
further lower the prices of low-carbon technologies (Kavlak, McNerney, & Trancik, 2018; 
Nemet, 2019). This is a non-linear process often approximated by s-curves of adoption. 
(Rogers, 2003). The cheaper a new technology becomes, the more widely it is used, and 
through scale and learning effects becomes even cheaper, until it emerges as the ‘new 
normal’ (Arthur, 1989), altering the technological paradigm (Dosi, 1982). Structural change 
between technologies and the change in the ratio of relative demand can thus accelerate 
over time, which has led to underestimating the rate of adoption of low-carbon technologies 
(Creutzig et al., 2017). Since technology diffusion self-reinforces and evolves endogenously, 
once set in train, it can contribute substantially to price changes even without any new policy 
changes. As a new socio-technical regime gradually establishes itself, it requires decreasing 
amounts of external support to diffuse further (Geels, 2002).  
Preference change 
Buyers’ preferences and the public’s support for particular products and policies can drive 
demand and prices. Preferences are endogenous to institutions and their changes (Bowles, 
1998) and the more people use a technology, network externalities may accelerate further 
adoption (McShane, Bradlow, & Berger, 2012; Pettifor, Wilson, Axsen, Abrahamse, & 
Anable, 2017). Through their demand-pull effect, preferences can also affect the pace and 
direction of technological change, which can interact with government procurement policies 
(Boon & Edler, 2018). Lastly, preference changes can stir political movements, putting 
broader pressure on policy making and changing what is politically feasible.7 The public 
mobilisation against nuclear fission provides a cautionary story for other technologies 
(Boudet, 2019). Therefore, changes in preferences can lead both to price changes and 
quantity restrictions. 
Transition costs 
Transition drivers translate into transition costs (Figure 1, box 2) via two transmission 
channels (Figure 1, arrow B). Price and quantity changes lead to adjustments in all sectors, 
affecting revenues of producers, the real income of households, and state tax revenue. 
Although prices of high-carbon production may rise, market price behaviour may be more 
complex (see Sidebar 1). But the drivers also transmit via expectations about future revenue 
streams, especially if policy and preference changes are credible and long-lasting (Helm, 
 
7 Of course, this blade cuts both ways. While ‘Fridays for Future’ and ‘Extinction Rebellion’ protests of 
2019 may make stringent policy more feasible (Horton, 2019), protests may also constrain the rollout 
of climate policy (Jewell & Cherp, 2020). 
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Hepburn, & Mash, 2003). For example, some of the car bans discussed above lack credible 
enforcement mechanisms (Plötz, Axsen, Funke, & Gnann, 2019), and current Nationally 
Determined Contributions under the Paris agreement, are subject to implementation (den 
Elzen et al., 2019; Pauw, Castro, Pickering, & Bhasin, 2019). But if expectations do change, 
they can do so quickly and across the board due to herd effects, also directly affecting the 
financial sector (arrow A). 8 This leads to asset stranding. 
Sidebar 1: The effect of a carbon price on fossil fuel prices 
Carbon taxes are likely to have two opposite effects on fossil fuel prices. In the short run, 
consumer prices will rise as firms pass costs on to consumers, lowering demand, while 
producers earn less revenue per unit sold, a typical consequence of a tax increase in a 
partial equilibrium setting. In the long run, profit opportunities from cheaper low-carbon 
substitutes could induce an accelerated structural change away from fossil fuels, which 
could lower prices due to lack of demand and oversupply. If fossil fuel producers expect 
demand not to recover in the long run, but to decline further, they might decide to flood the 
market in the short-run in a race to the bottom, to sell whatever they can, the ‘green paradox’ 
(Jensen, Mohlin, Pittel, & Sterner, 2015). This accelerates the price decline as the lowest-
cost producers capture what is left of the declining market (Mercure et al., 2018).  
Physical asset stranding 
A growing literature analyses high-carbon physical assets at risk of stranding. The risk that 
excess reserves of fossil-fuel companies poses for their valuation was briefly reviewed in 
Section 3. The inconsistency that arises between the valuation of these resources by fossil-
fuel companies, and the valuation consistent with climate-change mitigation is discussed by 
Bebbington et al. (2019).9 Davis et al. (2010) calculate that existing fossil-fuel sector assets 
in 2009 would emit about 500 Gt of CO2, or about half the carbon budget then remaining. 
These assessments have since been refined for fossil electricity assets and show an 
increasingly slim opportunity for new-build non-stranded assets (Davis & Socolow, 2014; 
Johnson et al., 2015; Pfeiffer, Hepburn, Vogt-Schilb, & Caldecott, 2018). Yet, uncertainty 
remains: Rozenberg et al. (2015) calculate that for a 2°C warming scenario any fossil fuel 
asset built after 2017 cannot start operating if existing assets are prioritised and the carbon 
budget is to be respected. Meanwhile, Smith et al. (2019) find that current fossil fuel 
infrastructure does not yet commit the world to warming beyond 1.5°C. Part of this range 
arises from the uncertainty about the size of the carbon budget itself (Rogelj, Forster, 
Kriegler, Smith, & Séférian, 2019).  
Asset stranding can spill out of the fossil energy sector. Considering the relevance of fossil 
fuels as inputs in mining and manufacturing processes, which then provide crucial 
intermediate inputs to downstream sectors, stranding of physical assets could take place 
virtually anywhere in the economy. Cahen-Fourot et al. (2019) show how moving away from 
fossil fuels as input factors could create significant ‘cascades’ of asset stranding across the 
production network of European economies. In the building sector (including residential 
housing), retrofitting costs may exceed private returns (Fowlie, Greenstone, & Wolfram, 
 
8 In a rational expectations framework, stranded assets occur under policy time-inconsistency 
(Kalkuhl, Steckel, & Edenhofer, 2019). 
9 Research supported by the fossil fuel producer Shell suggests the deployment of carbon capture 
and storage could allow significantly more reserves being exploited while respecting the carbon 
budget (Budinis, Krevor, Dowell, Brandon, & Hawkes, 2018). 
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2018; Muldoon-Smith & Greenhalgh, 2019), and IRENA (2017) projects the building sector 
to hold the most stranded assets. Unruh (2000) coined the term ‘carbon lock-in’. In short, 
both land and produced capital inputs can become stranded. 
Research has been conducted on systematically valuing the loss of assets due to stranding. 
Mercure et al. (2018) estimate losses of $1tn-$4tn in the fossil in the fossil fuel sector in the 
period 2016-2035 under various scenarios including the current trajectory of low-carbon 
technology without additional policy measures, while $0.957tn of power sector asset 
stranding until 2050 was found in a bottom up assessment by Saygin et al. (2019). One of 
the most cited works in this area is in the grey literature: for the IEA’s Below 2 Degree 
scenario, Carbon Tracker and PRI estimate one third of business as usual investments into 
oil and gas, or $1.6tn, would be stranded in the period 2018-2025 (Carbon Tracker & 
UNPRI, 2018). IRENA (2017) calculates an economy-wide $10tn stranded over the period 
2015-50, which increases to $20tn in a scenario of delayed transition policies. Dietz et al. 
(2016) calculate value at risk from the transition to be 0.4% of global financial assets, or 
$0.6tn. Recent analytical models show how, depending on the type and stringency of the 
policy implemented, some asset stranding in the form of underutilisation of installed capital is 
not only likely, but also optimal from a social perspective (Coulomb, Lecuyer, & Vogt-Schilb, 
2019; Rozenberg, Vogt-Schilb, & Hallegatte, 2018) . None of these studies model the impact 
of asset stranding on the financial sector.  
Other transition costs 
Along with asset stranding, workers could also become ‘stranded’. Although net aggregate 
job changes in a rapid transition could be positive even in large-scale fossil fuel producing 
countries, high-carbon sectors are likely to suffer from significant unemployment (Bastidas & 
Mc Isaac, 2019; Pollin, 2015). Without stabilising government policy, high-cost fossil fuel 
producers could even lose up to 3% (USA) and 8% (Canada) of employment (Mercure et al. 
2018), when including multiplier and knock-on effects of income and spending changes 
across the economy. As reviewed in Section 2, transitional unemployment is well 
documented for structural change. A fast-growing policy literature considers prospects and 
costs for retraining workers to ensure a ‘just transition’ (ILO, 2015; Oei et al., 2020; Pollin, 
2019). 
Governments could also lose tax and other revenue from plunging sales and incomes of 
their domestic industries (not to be confused with carbon price revenue reviewed in section 
5), especially, but not exclusively for fossil fuel exporters. For instance, Malova and van der 
Ploeg (2017) calculate that low oil and gas demand, in line with a 2°C scenario, would 
require the Russian government to divert an additional 0.9% of GDP a year towards 
investments outside the fossil energy sector in order to keep the fiscal stance sustainable. 
Regulations, such as production quotas or standards, may also restrict revenue. 
Real incomes of households could shrink due to rising prices, in addition to loss of 
employment, declining return on investments. These costs apply unequally. As poor 
households spend a larger fraction of their incomes on high-carbon products, a carbon tax 
would be regressive without countervailing redistribution. For the US, Fremstad & Paul 
(2019) estimate that households in the poorest deciles incur 50% more additional costs as a 
fraction of their expenditure than households in the highest decile. Strict low-carbon building 
and appliance regulations, while not ‘stranding’, may affect the value of residential housing 
unequally, and disproportionately impact the financial position of households struggling to 
raise the capital for retrofitting existing houses (Brown, Sorrell, & Kivimaa, 2019; Cabrera 
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Serrenho, Drewniok, Dunant, & Allwood, 2019; Schleich, 2019). Since poorer households 
are at a higher risk of defaulting on loans, such regressive impacts can create further risks 
for the financial sector. 
Financial impacts 
Transition costs impact the financial system (Figure 1, box 3) via two transmission channels: 
credit and market risks (Figure 1, arrow C). First, the loss of assets and income increases 
the likelihood of default on debt; therefore, banks could see their share of non-performing 
loans grow. Higher ratios of non-performing loans could in turn reduce the profitability of the 
lending bank, affect its market valuation and, if the phenomenon is significant enough, lead 
to its default (Dafermos & Nikolaidi, 2019b). The significance of this effect depends on how 
exposed the banking system is to industries that will have to decline as part of the low-
carbon transition (see Vermeulen et al. (2019) and Giuzio et al. (2019) for data concerning 
Dutch and eurozone banks). 
Second, institutional investors and other institutions holding financial assets could suffer 
negative portfolio effects due to the revaluation of assets triggered by the transition process 
(Campiglio, Monnin, & von Jagow, 2019). The transition costs reviewed above, or 
expectations about their realisation, could induce financial analysts to revise the expected 
discounted cashflow that carbon-intensive firms will offer in the future, thus leading to a 
reduction in the current value of financial assets.10 The revaluation could also take place 
‘endogenously’, as a result of the application of new valuation models by financial analysts. 
Whoever holds the devalued financial assets will see their wealth diminished. Economic 
theory is gradually incorporating transition-related risks into both growth and asset pricing 
theory (van der Ploeg & Rezai, 2020), and precise numerical estimates for specific investors 
are being estimated (e.g. Monasterolo, Zheng, & Battiston, 2018). 
The impact of the transition on private financial markets could go well beyond the direct 
exposure of investors to carbon-intensive sectors, due to second-round effects. Financial 
systems have featured deeply connected networks throughout history (Graeber, 2011), and 
international financial liberalisation since the 1970s has only reinforced this 
interconnectedness (Christophers, 2013). Financial institutions tend to be heavily exposed to 
each other (Battiston, Puliga, Kaushik, Tasca, & Caldarelli, 2012). In particular, many 
financial assets are used as collateral in short-term repurchase agreements (repos), so any 
decline in asset prices can cause liquidity problems. This means that a financial institution 
could be strongly negatively affected by the low-carbon transition even if not directly 
exposed to carbon-intensive sectors by ‘second-round effects’ (Battiston, Mandel, 
Monasterolo, Schütze, & Visentin, 2017). A further decline of asset prices could occur due to 
fire sales; episodes in which too many companies simultaneously sell off assets to try to pay 
off excessive debt and avoid bankruptcy. This could prompt a vicious cycle of asset price 
falls and sell-outs, known as debt-deflation (Fisher, 1932).  
The overall effect of such revaluations of financial assets remains unclear, but is being 
addressed by a nascent research literature published mostly outside of, or in collaboration 
 
10 The extent of current mis-valuation is contested. Byrd and Cooperman (2018) argue coal asset 
stranding is already priced into investors’ expectations, while Silver (2017) avers that stranded asset 
risk is invisible to institutional investors. Griffin et al. (2015) discuss reasons for the lack of response 
of investors to news about impending stranded assets, and Sen & von Schickfus (2020) suggest high-
carbon firms expect compensation for anticipated stranding. Christophers (2019) reports and 
analyses investors’ views. 
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with, academia (e.g. HSBC, 2019; Mercer, 2019; UNEP FI, 2019). Two types of analytical 
approaches are employed (Campiglio et al., 2019). First, studies looking at the long term 
usually project transition scenarios to the future, derive sectoral economic gains/costs, and 
transform them into changes in financial asset prices. This approach is implicitly based on 
the representation of the low-carbon transition as a relatively smooth process of reallocation 
of resources from certain sectors to others, with financial investors placidly following. 
However, financial sector dynamics are often characterised by sudden changes of 
‘sentiments’ leading to unexpected volatility of prices. PRA (2018) calls the eventuality of 
fluctuations of the sentiments of investors concerning the likelihood of future transition 
scenarios a ‘climate Minsky moment’.11 In order to grasp these effects, a second research 
approach uses the ‘stress testing’ conceptual framework to analyse the reaction of asset 
prices to certain types of shocks (e.g. a change in consumer preferences) and the effect of 
these changes on the portfolios of financial institutions (Vermeulen et al., 2019).  
Table 1 summarises outputs from the few academic and a selected number of central bank 
studies that report exposure of banks to high-carbon sectors (rows 1,2), and stress tests in 
the sense that 2nd round effects are traced (3) and feedback to the economy is considered 
(4). The last two rows show value at risk, and a scenario study for physical risks, i.e. from 
climate change itself. The studies cannot be directly compared, as they use various system 
boundaries. But it is clear that only looking at direct exposure (1,2) gives much lower values 
than when tracing second-round effects (3,4). 
Table 1: Estimates of potential maximal financial exposure to transition risks, and 
comparison with physical impact estimates 
# Region & Channel Channel 
Scenario (with value in parentheses 
as a share of regional GDP) 
1 Giuzio et al. (2019) 
1st round exposure of 40 
European banks 
Exposure to 20 largest emitting firms 
amounts to 1.8% of 40 banks’ assets 
(---) 
2 Nieto (2019) 
Outstanding syndicated 
loans in China, Europe, 
Japan, Switzerland, USA 
to high environmental risk 
Outstanding loans amount to 1.6 
trillion 2014 USD (3.1% of GDP of 
selected countries) 
3 Battiston et al. (2017) 
1st & 2nd round exposure of 
top 50 EU banks to high-
carbon assets 
100% loss of fossil fuel & utility sector 
portfolio wipes out 13.5% of top 50 
banks’ equity (32.7% of European 
Union GDP) 
4 Vermeulen et al. (2018) 
1st & 2nd round impacts on 
portfolios of 80 Dutch 
financial institutions 
Loss of up to 0.16 trillion 2018 EUR 
when combining technology and 
policy shocks (up to 18% of Dutch 
GDP) 
Physical risk studies for comparison: 
 
11 The timing of the change in expectations is contingent on the drivers, but the 2020s were 
highlighted as the most likely period in which the carbon bubble may burst and carbon risks 
materialise (UNPRI, 2019; Bond, 2019). Scenarios charting pathways to meet the Paris targets also 
see global fossil fuel demand peaking in the 2020s (Rogelj et al., 2018). 
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5 Dietz et al. (2016) 
Global assets at risk under 
DICE BAU vs mitigation 
scenario 
99th percentile of total assets at risk 
amounts to 24.2 trillion 2013 USD 
(31.5% of global GDP) 
6 Lamperti et 
al. (2019) 
Global bank failures from 
physical risks 
Additional government expenditure 
needed to rescue banks (5-15% of 
global GDP) 
Note: Where possible, the comparison with GDP was calculated by using regional GDP 
figures in current national currency or USD from the IMF. 
 
Further macroeconomic impacts 
Transition costs and financial impacts could each trigger further macroeconomic impacts 
(Figure 1, box 4, and arrows D and E); in particular aggregate demand may fall. This could in 
turn amplify transition costs and financial impacts, sending the economy into a downward 
spiral of negative real-financial interactions with negative macroeconomic multipliers 
amplifying initial losses. We highlight some of the possible channels for demand reductions 
as follows.  
Banking channel. The increase in non-performing loans could lead to credit rationing by 
commercial banks. Even if the origin of the shock lies in carbon-intensive sectors, credit 
rationing could affect all sectors irrespective of their carbon intensity. This might translate 
into higher interest rates, or a quantitative rationing of credit, which would in turn lead to a 
drop in investment levels of both firms (new capital assets), households (new real estate) 
and governments (new public infrastructure). Lower investment would reduce aggregate 
demand, affecting in turn expenditure in all sectors. 
Investment channel. In addition to having limited access to credit, firms might have less 
appetite for investments if the transition has led to a drop in their market valuation 
depressing confidence and expectations. Behind this lies ‘Tobin’s q’ theory, which suggests 
that a low market capitalisation to book value ratio lowers investments.12 If the crisis affects 
the entire economy, these effects may also reduce investment in low-carbon sectors. 
Consumption channel. Reduced income and wealth levels could reduce household 
consumption levels. Widening income and wealth inequality in combination with stronger 
credit rationing may additionally impact consumption expenditure negatively, due to higher 
propensities to consume and inability to smooth consumption of poorer households 
(Amromin, De Nardi, & Schulze, 2018; Fisher, Johnson, Latner, & Smeeding, 2018). 
Public debt channel. Government expenditure is likely to initially react counter-cyclically to 
the reduction in other expenditure categories due to automatic stabilisers, public support to 
failing industries, and not least through the bail-out of failing financial institutions. However, 
higher public debt could translate into a lower capacity to spend in the future, especially in 
countries highly dependent on international credit markets.13 A worsening of sovereign credit 
ratings would also raise the corporate cost of capital, as the two tend to be related (Kling, Lo, 
Murinde, & Volz, 2018; Kling, Volz, Murinde, & Ayas, 2020). 
 
12 The original theory is subject to qualifications (Altissimo et al., 2005; Jovanovic & Rousseau, 2014). 
13 The problem of crowding-out would seem less relevant as a crisis-ridden and transforming 
economy is likely to be far from full capacity (Deleidi, Mazzucato, & Semieniuk, 2020; Heim & 
Mirowski, 1987). 
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Other macroeconomic effects. The low-carbon transition, especially if implemented in an 
uncoordinated way at the global level, could lead to changes in inflation, trade balances and 
exchange rates, which in turn could generate dynamics to re-assess existing international 
economic agreements (such as on trade). These impacts are, at the moment, very hard to 
adequately quantify.  
The combined effect of these impacts most likely decreases aggregate demand, which in 
turn could further exacerbate transition costs (arrow F), financial impacts. A negative 
feedback loop from asset stranding in sunset industries could lead to a full-blown credit 
crunch, which could make it hard for sunrise industry firms to finance investment in the short 
run and in turn affect transition drivers (arrow G). The only study that currently attempts to 
connect transition financial impacts with macroeconomic impacts is Vermeulen et al. (2018), 
highlighting the absence of possible financial cost in integrated climate change scenarios, 
both with and without mitigation (Farmer, Hepburn, Mealy, & Teytelboym, 2015). However, 
many of the channels from finance to the real economy and vice versa are explored widely in 
the macroeconomic literature, so any future modelling efforts can use these as benchmarks. 
 
Policy responses to mitigate transition risks 
While some policies drive the transition, others seek to mitigate systemic financial impacts. 
Following the 2008 financial crisis, central banks and financial supervisors have intensified 
efforts to strengthen financial regulation and identify systemic financial risks in order to 
mitigate these. Central banks in particular were subject to an intensive discourse on their 
role in safeguarding financial stability, and their mandate more broadly (e.g. Dikau & Volz, 
2020; e.g. G30, 2015; Volz, 2017). Building on early academic contributions on the role of 
financial governance in addressing climate-related financial risks (Campiglio, 2016; Volz, 
2017), monetary and financial authorities have started to include climate change among 
these systemic risks and consider adequate policy responses to mitigate them.14 Most 
attention has been devoted to the risk of abrupt changes in asset valuations due to stranded 
assets. Hence, much of the discussion on policy responses has centred around ways to 
mitigate sunset sector risk. Growing attention is now also being paid to impacts on sovereign 
risks – stemming both from physical and transition risks – and how these can be mitigated 
(Battiston & Monasterolo, 2019; Buhr et al., 2018; Kling et al., 2018; Volz et al., 2020). There 
has also been a discussion on the role of financial policies in scaling up investment in green 
activities, such as green supporting factors in financial regulation or green asset purchases 
by central banks (e.g. Vaze, Meng, & Giuliani, 2019). This discourse has largely ignored 
potential risks from rising industries. 
Regulatory responses are mainly preventive in that they aim at providing information and 
incentivising the move away from high-carbon assets, so that any future transition driver has 
less impact. They include suggestions for enhancing transparency through taxonomies of 
‘green’ and ‘brown’ assets and a (mandatory) disclosure of risks (Thomä, Dupré, & Hayne, 
2018; Volz et al., 2015), climate-related stress testing at both micro and macro prudential 
level (Battiston et al., 2017), and climate calibrated capital rules or collateral frameworks.15 
Initially, the focus was on a disclosure of financial risks from climate change, which would 
help firms to manage, and financial markets to price in these risks and thus avoid rapid 
 
14 See, for instance, Batten et al. (2016), ESRB (2016), Finansinspektionen (2016), Regelink et al. 
(2017), PRA (PRA, 2018) and NGFS (2019). 
15 For an overview of policy tools available to central banks and supervisors see Dikau & Volz (2019). 
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revaluation. In January 2016, the Financial Stability Board established a Task Force on 
Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD). In its report in 2017, the TCFD makes 
recommendations on disclosures at the firm level (TCFD, 2017). Risks that are thus 
disclosed can then be assessed under different scenarios of the future, and firms can use 
these for risk management (Berg, Clapp, Lannoo, & Peters, 2018; TCFD, 2016). The 
financial sector is to use the disclosures for adequate pricing. There have also been 
proposals for introducing risk differentials in financial regulation, i.e. high-carbon penalising 
or low-carbon supporting factors (Dafermos & Nikolaidi, 2019a). 
The current thinking of policy makers is captured in the work of the Central Banks and 
Supervisors Network for Greening the Financial System (NGFS), a group of more than 50 
central banks and supervisors, established at the Paris One Planet Summit in December 
2017. In April 2019, the NGFS (2019) put forward a high-level framework for the integration 
of climate-related factors into prudential supervision, comprising five elements. According to 
this framework, the first step is to raise awareness of climate-related risks and build capacity 
amongst firms to analyse their exposure. The second step is the assessment of climate risks 
at both the micro and macro prudential level, i.e. at the level of individual financial institutions 
and the financial system as a whole. Examples include the assessment of financial 
institutions’ exposure to high-carbon sectors, or possible impacts of tightening energy 
efficiency regulation on the valuation of energy inefficient homes. Climate-related stress 
tests could be conducted at the level of financial institutions and of the system at large. The 
third step suggested by the NGFS is to provide guidance to regulated firms on appropriate 
approaches to governance, strategy and risk management to mitigate climate-related risks. 
Step four is about climate-related disclosures to enhance transparency and promote market 
discipline. This may include an integration of climate-related disclosure requirements in line 
with the TCFD recommendations into Pillar 3 of the Basel III banking regulations. The fifth 
and final step is to consider additional capital charges related to climate risks. This could 
include an integration of climate-related capital surcharges into the minimum capital 
requirements under Pillar 1 of the Basel III regulatory framework, or special capital 
requirements for firms that exhibit higher risk concentration in their balance sheet or that do 
not comply with supervisory expectations under Pillar 2. The NGFS (2019, p. 6) emphasises 
that climate change-related financial risks “are best mitigated through an early and orderly 
transition.” 
Existing stabilisation policy has been criticised by academic studies as inadequate. In 
particular, researchers have criticised too strong a focus on disclosure and the expectation 
that it will lead to an “efficient market reaction to climate change risks” (Carney, 2015, p. 12). 
For instance, (Christophers, 2017, p. 1124) contends that “there is something fundamentally 
awry with expecting enhanced disclosure to miraculously provide financial systemic safety.” 
Ameli et al. (2019) argue, based on interviews with investors, that disclosure by itself is 
insufficient to change investment behaviour, as the argument rests on the unrealistic efficient 
market hypothesis (that financial markets price in all information). Monasterolo et al. (2017) 
note the difficulty of disclosing supply-chain carbon exposure. Lastly, disclosure may help re-
classify fossil fuel assets as junk, but does not make their associated systemic risk 
disappear (Mercure, 2019). These sentiments are reflected in the IPCC’s recent assessment 
that effective mitigation would require an evolution of the global financial system (de Coninck 
et al., 2018). Against this, some central bankers have, while acknowledging their role as 
financial regulators by enhancing transparency and stress testing, insisted that central banks 
ought to adhere to the principle of market neutrality in the conduct of monetary policy and 
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not favour green assets over brown (e.g. Weidmann, 2019). Proposals for risk differentials in 
financial regulation or collateral policies, and any activist policies aimed at fostering a green 
transition, have been controversial (Dikau & Volz, 2019). Nevertheless, a growing number of 
central banks and supervisors have started to implement micro and macro prudential 
measures to address transition risks (D’Orazio & Popoyan, 2019; Dikau & Volz, 2020; 
Frisari, Gallardo, Nakano, Cárdenas, & Monnin, 2019) or are considering doing so, going 
beyond disclosure and stress testing. 
There is also a growing awareness of low-carbon transition risks for finance among finance 
ministries.16 A Coalition of Finance Ministers for Climate Action (CAPE) was established by 
23 countries in April 2019 and has since grown to more than 50 members, all of which have 
signed the six “Helsinki Principles”, committing to national climate action and incorporating 
climate change into financial policies. While climate-related financial risks and impacts are 
included in the deliberations, to date the emphasis of CAPE has been primarily on fiscal 
policies.17 
Lastly, and although we cannot go into depth, it is important to mention that appropriate 
redistributive and industrial policy can also reduce financial risks indirectly by mitigating 
transition costs (box 2) . For a budget-neutral example, consider how government revenue 
from carbon taxes or auctioned-off emission permits could be used as a tool to mitigate 
transition costs for households. If part of this revenue is redistributed among citizens, and 
since richer households consume more carbon and thus pay a higher price in absolute 
terms, feebates turn carbon prices into a progressive instrument (Boyce, 2018), and just 
transition policies would further mitigate impacts. Government revenue could also be used to 
maintain minimum company solvency during the transition (Caldecott & Dericks, 2018), and 
industrial policy could direct (private and public) investments into sunrise industries to help 
reduce the amount of assets at risk of stranding. One vehicle for this is existing public 
development banks that have long experience with financing industrial policy and can 
strategically focus on structural change through their mandates and ability to function on 
lower operating margins than commercial lenders (Geddes, Schmidt, & Steffen, 2018; 
Griffith-Jones & Ocampo, 2018; Mazzucato & Penna, 2016). Note, however, that loss of 
substantial revenues from fossil-fuel royalties in major fossil-fuel producer countries could 
affect the ability of those nations to support the low-carbon transition through fiscal means. 
 
Conclusion 
Low-carbon transition risks for finance are likely to be generated mainly from unanticipated, 
stringent climate-mitigation policy, but also from technological and preference changes and 
their interaction with each other. The current academic research on these topics addresses 
 
16 The French Ministry of Finance was among the first to address climate risk for the financial sector. 
Enacted in August 2015, Article 173 of the French Energy Transition Act introduced mandatory 
reporting requirements on climate-related financial risks and the measures adopted to mitigate them 
for listed companies and/or large non-listed firms, including both non-financial and financial firms 
(Direction Générale du Trésor, n.d.). 
17 Helsinki Principle 5 (“Mobilize private sources of climate finance by facilitating investments and the 
development of a financial sector which supports climate mitigation and adaptation”) includes the 
identification of “strategies to incorporate climate risks and opportunities into investment decisions, 
such as supporting global efforts for transparency and disclosure of climate-related financial risks and 
impacts, identifying risks to financial stability posed by climate change, and considering ways to 
manage these risks” (CAPE, 2019, p. 3). 
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either the real-economy transition costs, or the financial impact, but does little to connect the 
two. A comprehensive theoretical framework of sunset industry systemic risks for finance is 
lacking as the theoretical and historical literature has focussed on risks from sunrise 
industries instead. We contribute to thinking about the conceptual issues in understanding 
transition risks from sunset industries by developing a consistent theoretical framework of 
the drivers, transmission channels and impacts of the phase-out of carbon-intensive 
industries on the financial system. An important insight from existing Schumpeterian theory 
on financial risks of transition, however, is that once low-carbon industries do become more 
productive, as the sunrise industries in previous transitions ultimately did, the potential for 
financial instability begins to threaten the low-carbon sector too. 
High-carbon industries could abruptly become uncompetitive due to strong climate-change 
mitigation policy and the resulting price changes and expectations, reinforced by fast 
technological change and preference changes. These transition drivers cause physical 
assets to lose their ability to generate revenue and become stranded. Asset stranding 
combines with other transition costs, notably unemployment, losses in revenue, profits and 
reductions in real incomes that generate significant risks for portfolio losses and debt default. 
Financial actors might become unable to service their own debt and obligations, creating 
loss propagation within the financial network. The adverse impact of credit tightening and 
lack of confidence as well as the direct impact of transition costs on the macroeconomy, 
could lead to a general economic crisis with further risks for finance. None of this suggests 
that financial markets would be better off without or with a limited transition: several studies 
have clearly demonstrated that financial sector exposure to the transition already exists, and 
delaying climate-change action would only necessitate an even more rapid and potentially 
more damaging transition in the future, while exposure to physical risks under unmitigated 
climate change would be drastically increased. Targeted financial stabilization policies, 
however, can mitigate some transition risks by direct regulation of the financial sector, as 
well as intervention at the transition cost stage. 
What the current transition needs is a set of theoretical propositions and stylized facts about 
the link between fast depreciation of capital and financial impact. These could be 
implemented in multi-sectoral models with a financial sector and vintage capital structure. 
Putting together real and financial economic mechanisms would make it possible to explore 
the whole set of interlinked parts of transition drivers, costs and impacts to arrive at 
benchmarks both of systemic risk and effects of policy measures.  
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